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A treaty is a formal agreement between sovereign states, usually documented in 
writing.  Such formal agreements are central to the conduct of international relations.  It 
would be hard to write an international history of the western world without some 
reference to the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), which some credit with the foundations of 
the modern state system, the Treaty of Paris (1814), which defined the end of the 
Napoleonic era, or the Versailles Treaty (1919), which informed generations of leaders 
how not to secure post-war peace.  It would similarly be difficult to understand the 
modern system of world trade without some reference to the 1948 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade or the more recent 1995 Marrakesh agreement that created the World 
Trade Organization, or to understand post World War II security arrangements without 
reference to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty or the 1955 Warsaw Pact.  Beginning in the 
1960s, a series of human rights treaties have supported the “rights revolution” 
characteristic of the latter twentieth century.  International treaties are one of the oldest 
forms of communication among sovereigns and some 3,000 multilateral and 27,000 
bilateral treaties are in effect today.
1  While treaties hardly reflect the totality of state-to-
state relationships even in the West, they are certainly crucial documents for conducting 
international relations. 
Ask any legal scholar why treaties are important, and she will very likely mention 
their “legally binding” nature.  Treaties generally create legal obligations among states 
                                                 
1 John Gamble, based on Wiktor’s Calendars, Rohn’s indices, and Treaties in Force. 2 
that are parties to them.  Treaties are not the only source of international legal obligation; 
international law scholars will also point to customary international law as a legitimate 
source of legal obligation among states as well. Political scientists have scarcely studied 
customary international law at all.  For many empirical researchers, custom derived from 
practice has the feel of circularity if the research motivation is to understand international 
law’s influence on behavior. Custom is also substantively harder to grasp: its rules are 
often hard to establish because it is not written down, and unlike in the domestic context, 
the resort to legal clarifications by international courts is rare. Because political science 
research has largely focused on treaties (synonyms include accords, agreements, 
conventions and covenants), these will be the focus of this article.  
While all treaties are obligation-creating legal instruments, not all are equally 
“binding.”  The legal literature distinguishes “hard law” and “soft law” (Shelton 1997) 
and treaties while always obligatory can contain both.  The key is in the language chosen 
to describe the obligation.  “Must” is the language of hard law; “should” is that of soft 
law. Hence, obligations – even those contained in treaties – can have shades of 
stringency. Duncan Snidal and Kenneth Abbott argue that states choose hard law 
language when they want to avoid high transaction costs associated with future 
interactions, but prefer soft law when negotiation costs are high (Abbott & Snidal 2000).  
This is an example of a broader set of issues that is certainly relevant to treaty violation: 
how the agreement was written in the first place (Koremenos 2005; Koremenos et al 
2001; Rosendorff & Milner 2001; Smith 2000). “Details” about membership, escape 
clauses, and dispute settlement can influence violation and compliance, and while this 3 
article does not treat the question of institutional design as a distinct subsection, it is 
central to some of the literature discussed below.  
Finally, it is worth noting that states are only bound by international treaties if 
they have ratified them, and ratification itself is not obligatory; it is based on consent.  
Ratification rules vary by state, and some of the approaches discussed below specifically 
take the mode of ratification into account, theorizing that higher ratification “hurdles” 
imply real dedication to the purposes of the agreement and hence augur well for 
compliance.  Many research designs designate ratification itself as the “treatment” that is 
theorized to influence the behavioral outcome of interest (Hathaway 2002; Simmons 
2009).  The approach potentially underestimates broader treaty effects, since norms 
contained in treaties could be internalized and practiced by non-ratifiers as well.  Another 
research design is to explain the variance in compliance among treaty parties only 
(Bernhagen 2008; Dai 2007) which facilitates modeling pressures to violate or to comply, 
but cannot address the treaty’s impact relative to non-state parties.  Alost all studies of the 
influence of treaties on state behavior encounter serious issues of endogeneity and 
selection, both with respect to the provisions of the treaty and with respect to ratification. 
Since treaties exist and are written for specific purposes, it is hard to know how much 
causal weight to attribute to the treaty or the underlying purpose.  Ratification is quite 
obviously not random either.  Methods exist to address endogeneity and selection, but 
they involve trade-offs and are highly imperfect (Simmons & Hopkins 2005; von Stein 
2005).   
Political science research on treaty violation and compliance has been a 
tremendously productive area of research over the past decade.  The growth has been 4 
mainly on the empirical side; the debate about meta-theoretical orientations has subsided 
(compare Simmons 1998). Scholars are less concerned to affix a label their approach 
(realist, Kantian liberalist, liberal institutionalist, constructivist, democratic process 
school, legal process school, enforcement school managerial school, transformationalist 
school to name a few from the1990s), than they are to make a coherent argument and to 
test specific mechanisms. Research has become decided more quantitative than it was a 
decade ago, especially in the area of human rights. Thanks to the systematic efforts of 
governmental and non-governmental international organizations, government agencies 
and teams of scholars, the data now available to assess compliance is far more extensive 
and informative than it was only a few years ago. Controversies and lacunae obviously 
still remain, but international and comparative politics scholars, sometimes in co-
authorship with legal scholars, have significantly advanced the study of the politics of 
treaty compliance in recent years.   
 
II.  Theoretical Approaches to Treaty Violation and Compliance 
One of the most gratifying aspects about the research on international law and 
international relations is that debates over meta-theoretical orientations have become 
muted in the interest of going after genuine puzzles.  Long standing theoretical traditions 
continue to inform research, and to some extent realism inspires the null hypothesis of 
choice. But today’s realists are more likely to stress international law’s 
epiphenomenalism rather than its utterly irrelevance to international politics (Downs et al 
1996; Goldsmith & Posner 2005).  Moreover, some realists at least acknowledge the 
possibility that international law might influence state behavior – even in wartime – by 5 
theorizing and testing for its possible influence in their research (Valentino et al 2006).  
The “irrelevance” of international law to international politics no longer has the status of 
a self-evident truth among realist theorists. 
The dominant view in international relations – shared by a broad range of scholars 
working in a rationalist tradition – recognizes that agreements that cannot be enforced by 
a third party must in some sense be “self-enforcing.” A self-enforcing agreement is one in 
which two or more parties adhere to the agreement as long as each gains more from 
continuing the agreement than from abrogating it. The agreement is “enforced” by the 
parties themselves by shutting down or reducing that future flow of benefits, not by third 
party sanctions.  Reciprocity and reputation are the key enforcement mechanisms. Robert 
Keohane’s early theories of compliance with international regimes followed this logic.  
Governments complied with their agreements for “reasons of reputation, as well as fear 
of retaliation and concern about the effects of precedents” (Keohane 1984).  As long as 
the parties expect the treaty to provide benefits that extend long enough into the future 
(the rate of future discount is low) self-interest can result in a high degree of compliance. 
There are limits of course to the possibilities for fashioning self-enforcing 
agreements among states. There may also be limits to the ability of reputational 
considerations to support self-enforcing agreements across unrelated issue areas, where 
behavior is difficult to observe, and within communities in which future interactions are 
sparse or not very highly valued (Downs & Jones 2002). Moreover, the ability of actors 
to regulate the exact message they want others to infer from their behavior may be 
limited, as governments often cultivate multiple reputations (Keohane 1997).  In trade, 
for example, a government may want to cultivate a domestic reputation for 6 
responsiveness to constituency interests but an international reputation for 
cooperativeness. Finally, “reputational sanctions”, like any other kind of sanction, may be 
sub-optimal if the community does not find a way to overcome collective action 
problems in its supply (Guzmán 2008). Since “enforcement” depends largely on 
reciprocity, this framework is useful for explaining stable trade agreements (Goldstein et 
al 2007) and some aspects of the laws of war, where militaries risk retaliation in kind 
(Morrow 2007).  It is also suitable for analyzing obligations whose violation might 
provoke negative market reactions, as is plausible in the area of monetary affairs and 
investment (Simmons 2000). 
Theories of self-enforcing agreements are related conceptually to theories of 
international law as an effort to bolster the credibility of a commitment. The assumption 
of credible commitment theory is that many states are unable to enjoy the “joint gains” 
implied by international agreements precisely because their potential partners do not 
know if they will carry them out. Incentives to misrepresent true intentions aggravate the 
contracting problem.  Almost all theories of credible commitments rest on the assumption 
of time-inconsistent preferences: it may be rational in time t to promise to behave 
according to an agreement, but in time t+1 it is likely that one or both parties will face 
incentives to renege. International treaties are sometimes analyzed as a device for 
enhancing credibility in order to enjoy the very real gains from cooperation that motivate 
contracting in the first place.   
The essential feature of credible commitments theory is that states must be willing 
to pay a non-trivial cost in order to participate in the agreement.   It is precisely the 
willingness to bear these costs that makes the agreement more credible than it would 7 
otherwise be.  Two kinds of costs are distinguished in the literature: ex ante (or “sunk”) 
costs that have the effect of credibly distinguishing a sincere government from an 
opportunistic one; and ex post costs that are paid if a violation takes place (Fearon 1997).  
High ex ante costs send a credible signal of intentions: no rational government would pay 
a high “down-payment” on a cooperative enterprise if they did not intend to carry it out.  
When a government pays high ex ante costs, other parties reasonably conclude that this 
type of government will follow through with its agreement.  High ex ante costs in effect 
screen governments by type, revealing their true nature. 
Signaling models of international treaty making are becoming quite common in 
the literature of the politics of international law.  One difference between treaties and 
other kinds of agreements is that they have to be formally ratified, and in most countries 
these formal procedures require legislative majorities (sometimes super-majorities) 
(Martin 2000).  Lisa Martin demonstrates theoretically and empirically the significance of 
the signaling power of treaties by showing that that United States presidents typically 
choose treaties rather than executive agreements for “high-value” international 
agreements.  She argues that higher cost treaty ratification is useful to assure other 
countries that the United States intends to comply (Martin 2005).  Similarly, in their 
research on alliance agreements, Andrew Long and co-authors argue that because of the 
up-front cost of negotiating and ratifying formal alliance agreements (compared, 
presumably to mere political agreements), these constitute credible commitments about a 
state’s intent to maintain peaceful relationships among the contracting parties (Long et al 
2007).  8 
Signaling models predict treaty compliance, but they do not explain it. Committed 
“types” are likely to pay the price for ratification, while uncommitted types are not.  
When it is politically costly, treaty ratification functions as a separating equilibrium, in 
which only the committed types are likely to pay the steep political costs of ratification.  
Successful signaling can enhance stable reciprocity (Morrow 2007), but signaling models 
per se do not  explain why certain states are more “committed types” in the first place. 
Costs paid ex post work in a different way, and more closely resemble the logic of 
self-enforcing agreements discussed above.  If ex ante costs can screen, then ex post costs 
can (theoretically) constrain. Ex post costs are simply the consequences of non-
compliance, which can range from trivial to monumental. When ex post costs are high 
enough, they can effectively change a government’s interest in compliance.  High ex ost 
costs encourage other parties to reduce their assessment of the likelihood of defection, 
increasing the range of agreements with which the parties have an incentive to comply.  
Several scholars have argued that agreements that contain arbitration, prosecution or 
dispute settlement mechanisms are efforts to make commitments more credible by 
ramping up ex post costs.  Examples include the International Criminal Court (Simmons 
& Danner 2010), bilateral investment treaties (Elkins et al 2006) and the more 
institutionalized provisions of some alliance pacts (Long et al 2007). 
Most treaties do not of course have strong external enforcement mechanisms.  In 
that case, why are treaties especially useful tools for credible commitment-making?  
Some scholars insist that there is something about a legal commitment that inherently 
raises ex post costs in the event of rule violation.  Andrew Guzman for example writes 
that treaties “represent the complete pledge of a nation’s reputational capital” (Guzman 9 
2002; see also Schachter 1991). This special quality of treaties may be due to the fact that 
they are embedded in a broader system of socially constructed interstate rule-making, 
normatively linked by the principle of pacta sunt servanda – the idea that agreements of a 
legally obligatory nature must be observed. Violating a legal agreement, in this view, 
provides information on both the government’s attitude toward the contents of the treaty 
(the specific rule) and respect for law itself (the broader set of principles in which the rule 
is embedded).  Note however, that for these reputational mechanisms to work, there must 
be widespread social agreement that law creates more serious obligations than other 
kinds of agreements, a point stressed by constructivist scholars. Arguably, treaties also 
allow for a more complete reputational commitment because of their capacity for clarity. 
Precision reduces the scope for plausible deniability of violation by narrowing the range 
of reasonable interpretation. In James Morrow’s rationalist interpretation of the laws of 
war, the relative precision of treaty arrangements supports reciprocity between warring 
states by clarifying prescribed and proscribed behaviors and limiting the permitted range 
of response to violation (Morrow 2007).  For these reasons, violating a treaty is often 
asserted to have more serious reputational consequences than reneging on a political 
commitment, ceteris paribus. 
These are reasonable arguments, but they rest on a very important assumption 
about the elevated social status of law.  While some international legal scholars may take 
this as an article of faith, hard-headed political scientists are now trying to assemble 
evidence that this is plausible.  Michael Tomz uses surveys laced with experiments that 
are designed to cue respondents that a particular act violates an international legal 
obligation, and attempts to assess the effect of this “cue” on respondents’ attitudes about 10 
that country and the actions it has taken.  His survey evidence suggests that respondents 
are much more likely to oppose policies when they are told they violates international 
law.  The evidence also suggests that international legal agreements raise expectations 
about compliance (Tomz 2008).  We should be cautious about jumping to conclusions 
based on such survey evidence; surveys about mass preferences do not translate easily 
into electoral pressures, and even elite surveys can be attacked for problems with eternal 
validity.  But Tomz’s evidence does suggest that a legal commitment enhances the 
reputational mechanism and may trigger audience costs that have rested for the most part 
on assertion. 
The notion that international legal commitments engage domestic audiences has 
reoriented some of the theoretical literature toward domestic and comparative politics. 
Xinyuan Dai has  developed a domestic theory of compliance that depends on new policy 
information generated by the often toothless international institutions legal agreements 
sometimes create.  Dai theorizes that compliance with international  agreements is 
enhanced through new information, generated by treaty bodies and monitoring systems, 
that inform and empower domestic voters to punish governments for actions of which 
they disapprove  (Dai 2007).  When a potential pro-compliance constituency is large 
(which is not always the case, even in democratic polities), and when an international 
agreement sheds significant new information on the government’s record of compliance, 
a government will have strong electoral reasons not to violate international agreements.  
Dai’s theory sheds light on why it is that liberal democracies are often better treaty 
compliers: they are populated by large numbers and dense networks of citizens with 
extensive interests in predictable and harmonious transnational relationships (Gaubatz 11 
1996; Slaughter 1995). But to the extent that the electoral mechanism is blunted or anti-
compliance groups dominate electoral politics the pressure on states to comply will 
diminish. 
The above theories flow largely from rational models of the pursuit of material 
interests or office seeking, as posited by the analyst. Another branch of theorizing treaty 
behavior emphasizes a more subjectivist logic and involves not merely changing 
incentives, but changing minds.  As alluded to in our discussion of the special status of 
law, constructivists tend to view treaties as more than contracts; they embody norms 
which reflect the social meanings and purposes of their propagators. Rules and norms are 
important because they “condition actors' self-understandings, references, and 
behavior..." (Reus-Smit 2004)..  As such, they become a key focal point for discursive 
struggles over legitimate political agency and action and critical resources in the 
international politics of legitimacy.  
International law has a special place in the array of social norms, some 
constructivists argue, because it shapes the justificatory politics that ultimate inform 
official actions.  International law comprises a particular kind of discourse based o the 
language of state sovereignty, justification, and obligation rather than power alone as 
reasons for taking certain actions and not others.  In this perspective, the nature of 
discourse has a tremendous influence on behavior.  Christian Reus-Smit goes so far as to 
suggest that,  "...legal right is as much a power resource as guns and money, and juridical 
sovereignty, grounded in the legal norms of international society, is becoming a key 
determinant of state power" (Reus-Smit 2004).  International politics is a struggle to 12 
define symbols of meaning; controversies surrounding international law are a 
manifestation of those struggles.  
If discourse and ideas inform politics, then much of the compliance is explicable 
in terms of what actors come to believe and value.  Compliance with rules can be 
enhanced through efforts at socialization, or what Kathryn Sikkink and Thomas Risse 
define as the process by which principled ideas become broadly accepted norms. Once 
they are internalized, these norms can lead to changes in interests, values and even 
identities, which in turn ultimately shape state behavior (Risse-Kappen et al 1999).   
Compliance is enhanced in this view when actors become socialized to comply. 
Socialization can mean three kinds of processes in this literature.  In a crude sense, actors  
(state elites) can be “socialized” through a system of rewards and punishments 
(Schimmelfennig 2005).  Some people prefer to call this coercion, or maybe 
conditioning. This form of socialization shades into incentive-based inducements 
discussed above. More subtly, actors can be encouraged through various cues indicative 
of social acceptance or approbation to bring their practices in line with international 
standards. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks refer to this as a process of acculturation  by 
which they mean the "general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral 
patterns of the surrounding culture"  (Goodman & Jinks 2004).  Acculturation includes a 
number of micro-processes such as mimicry, status maximization, and identification that 
are often at the heart of world institutionalist theories common in sociology (Finnemore 
1996).   This is compliance through conformity: social group tend to generate varying 
degrees of cognitive and social pressures, real or imagined, to bring behavior in 
alignment with that of peers. Acculturation involves "social costs" such as shaming or 13 
shunning as distinct from the more material costs associated with overt coercion. These 
pressures may lead to superficial compliance with international norms as reflected in 
treaty obligations, not necessarily the internationalization of norms as deeply held values 
(Strang & Chang 1993). 
Acculturation can be contrasted with a more fundamental form of socialization, 
often referred to in the literature as normative persuasion.  Persuasion depends on the 
power of argumentation and deliberation as distinct modes of social interaction which 
when successful changes what an actor values and sometimes even his or her very 
identity (Johnston 2001; Risse 2000).  Jeffrey Checkel defines persuasion as "a social 
process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the 
absence of overt coercion" (Checkel 2001).  He argues that persuasion is more likely to 
play an important role in explaining compliance behavior when elites do not have deeply 
held priors, and they are therefore open to new ways of thinking about issues. 
The socialization literature theorizes the diffusion of norms over time and space, 
but it is still puzzling as to why some norms seem to be internalized and complied with 
more than others.  Some scholars argue that the quality of the norm itself matters.  
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink propose that human rights norms that are the most 
universal in nature – those protecting innocent women and children – are the most widely 
held and have a special compliance pull (see also Hawkins 2004; Keck & Sikkink 1998).  
In his examination of arms control treaties during the interwar years, Jeffry Legro builds 
on the earlier insights of legal scholars Thomas Franck and Louis Henkin (Franck 1990; 
Henkin 1995) when he argues that qualities such as norm specificity, durability, and 
concordance improve prospects for compliance (Legro 1997). Others argue that norms 14 
will be more or less influential depending on how they mesh with domestic norms and 
institutions (Checkel 2001).  The idea that mass publics might play a role in the 
socialization of governments to comply with their international agreements is central to 
Frank Schimmelfennig’s research on the compliance of Eastern Europe with the 
governing standards of the West (Schimmelfennig 2005).   
Whether because of their persuasive function or their information providing 
function (or both) constructivists often agree with rational theorist that pressures applied 
by (often transnational) civil society tend to pressure or persuade governments to comply 
with international legal standards and obligation.  Sally Merry’s transnational 
ethnography of the role of transnational actors provides a rich description of how the 
process of persuasion and communication operates transnationally (Merry 2006).  
Transnational human rights ideas become part of local social movements and local legal 
consciousness through the work of individuals who have one authentic foot in the local 
culture and the other in the transnational world of United Nations conferences, meetings 
and workshops.  These individuals play a crucial role Merry’s felicitous phrase in 
“translating global principles into the local vernacular” (Merry 2006). This is a two-way 
form of communication, often supporting new ideas and identities at the local levels but 
also educating the global community about the local realities on the ground. 
Ideational theories have also been advanced linking democratic forms of domestic 
governance to better international law compliance. The normative argument for better 
treaty performance from more democratic governments has been framed in terms of 
“universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests” (Dixon 
1994) which draws from the broader literature in international relations on normative 15 
explanations for the democratic peace.  Democracies rest on a robust form of 
constitutionalism, which puts law at the heart of public legitimacy, and subjects all forms 
of public authority to principled limitations on the exercise of power.  Compliance with 
international treaty obligations in this view is consonant with compliance with domestic 
constitutional obligations; governments who are willing to recognize the latter are 
generally more willing to comply with the former (Gaubatz 1996).  In this view, a shared 
identity as a democratic state based on the rule of law renders compliance with 
international legal obligations the more appropriate policy choice.  
Despite the temptation to contrast so-called “ideational” theories with 
“rationalist” ones, the complementarities are striking.  Like rationalists, constructivists 
recognize that reputation surely matters to governments and their constituencies, but 
reputational concerns themselves are hardly exogenously given constructs; they are the 
result of intense socialization among state elites within a particular region(Lutz & 
Sikkink 2000).  Game theorists posit such concepts as “common conjectures” that 
facilitate reciprocation, but what are common conjectures but commonly shared 
assumptions about certain basic principles or beliefs about how the “game” should be 
played (Morrow 2007)?  Habermasian theories of communicative action have a 
sophisticated continental appeal (Risse 2000), but they often lead to analyses that bear a 
strong resemblance to what the Chayes in their more “managerial” style know 
colloquially as “jawboning” (Chayes & Chayes 1993).  Theorists of law compliance have 
been borrowing from one another’s conceptual toolkits for years.  That few any longer 
feel obliged to declare an exclusive theoretical affiliation has largely promoted theoretical 
rigor, not undercut it.  16 
 
II.  Treaty Compliance  - Empirical Studies by Issue Area 
The recent growth in research on international law violation and compliance has 
been largely in the area of empirical research.  Scholars, non-governmental organizations 
and governmental agencies are beginning systematically to collect and publish 
information that can help test hypotheses about the conditions under which governments 
comply with or violate their international treaty obligations.  I have selected four quite 
different issue to review these developments: war fighting, peace and security 
(traditionally dominated by realist theories); trade and commercial relationships 
(traditionally the domain of theories of reciprocity and self-enforcing agreements); 
environment protection (typically framed in terms of capacity issues  and information 
availability) and international human rights agreement (an issue in which constructivist 
theories have traditionally had the strongest influence).  Most but not all of these studies 
are quantitative, reflecting the flow of recently published research 
 
Warfighting, Peace and Security 
International legal agreements have played a huge role in relationships between 
states involving war, peace and security.  Alliances, peace agreements and terrotiral 
boundaries are all typically governed by treaties, as are the laws of war-fighting 
themselves.  The theoretical shift from a realist lens to that of credible commitments 
suggests why law pervades issues of national security: these are critical problems that are 
hard to solve unless costly commitments to comply are made.  Most of the literature in 
this area reflects the idea that treaties help states signal a serious intent to comply with 17 
agreements, marking a shift in security studies in the past decade to finally take these 
agreements seriously. 
The recent alliance literature exemplifies this approach. Formal alliances have 
generally been theorized as signals of a state’s intent to intervene militarily under certain 
conditions should war erupt (Morrow 1994).  As such, they are generally signed with the 
expectation that they will be complied with in case of war.  Research by Ashley Leeds 
and Burcu Savun based on data they collected for the Alliance Treaty Obligations and 
Provisions (ATOP) project suggests that most alliances are honored most of the time; but 
about 34% of alliance treaties for the past two centuries have ended in opportunistic 
violation (Leeds & Savun 2007) It is hard to know whether this is a “high” non-
compliance or not (compared to what?) but given the importance of alliances to vital 
national security interests, one might suppose this figure represents a fairly good rate of 
non-abrogration.  Some research suggests that states honor their alliance commitments as 
a way to preserve their reputation as a good ally into the future.  Douglas Gibler produces 
evidence that governments (note: not “states”) that abrogate their alliances are much less 
likely to be able to negotiate alliance relationships for the rest of their terms, making it 
much harder to deter potential aggressors (Gibler 2008).  Alliance treaties tend to be 
“self-enforcing agreements” in that the ex post consequences of abrogation entail very 
real risks to national security into the future.  Consistent with this view, Leeds and Savun 
found that the major condition under which states abrogate alliance treaties is when they 
experience a drastic change in circumstances from those prevailing when the treaty was 
ratified.  They found that violation was more than twice as likely when there was a 
significant change in relative international power of one or both of the parties, a 18 
significant change in domestic political institutions or the formation of a new outside 
alliance since the original alliance was formed.  While most alliance treaties are in fact 
honored, they do not create legal straightjackets that interfere with new definitions of 
what is in a state’s security interest. (Leeds & Savun 2007). 
The concept of audience costs has also been useful for understanding how formal 
agreements can influence the duration of peace.  After years of war and mistrust, 
agreements to make peace are difficult to make credible.  Treaties here again play an 
important role by raising ex post international audience costs as well as by signaling 
intentions ex ante.  They can also reduce uncertainty about actions and intentions; thus 
helping to reduce belligerents’ incentives to rekindle their conflict.  Virginia Page 
Fortna’s research suggests there is some empirical basis for viewing peace agreements in 
this way.  She finds that “stronger” peace agreements – by which she means ones that 
raise the costs of reneging by creating clear demilitarized zones, joint monitoring 
commissions, and third party guarantees – lead to more a durable peace (Fortna 2003). 
Similarly, Michaela Mattes examines the role of “conciliatory” agreements in the 
resolution of territorial disputes, and finds that those that reduce uncertainty and raise 
costs ex post are likely to reduce the risk that disputing parties will resort to militarized 
conflicts (Mattes 2008) But these cases raise the problem of the endogeneity of treaties.  
It is highly likely that governments design “strong” and/or “conciliatory” agreements 
when they are especially motivated to try and settle the dispute.  If so, is it the agreement 
or the underlying motivation to settle that drives the findings? 
Agreements that constrain military operations in the heat of battle present the 
most significant challenges for international treaties.  When independent state survival 19 
may be at stake, we have the most stringent test possible for the power of treaty 
agreements to constrain state behavior. The laws of war fighting are a good example.  
They embody norms to protected civilians and cultural property, to require decent 
treatment of prisoners, to medically treat wounded enemies, and so forth. Not only are 
there severe temptations to defect if banned practices might mean a military advantage; 
there is also the problem that atrocities of various kinds can be committed by individual 
soldiers even when it is against the policy of their government.  
The protection of civilians may be the most difficult problem of all. Benjamin 
Valentino and his co-authors test the proposition that international treaties on the laws of 
war during the twentieth century (1900-2003) has had a significant impact on the rates at 
which the militaries of warring state parties “intentionally” kill civilians (Valentino et al 
2006).  For each of 148 international conflicts of the past century, Valentino et al coded 
whether the parties had ratified the 1899 Hague Convention, the 1907 Hague Convention, 
the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the Geneva Convention Protocols of 1977.  They 
found that the intentional killing of civilians was correlated with the strategy chosen to 
prosecute the war, but not influenced at all by ratification of the relevant treaty for the 
time period under question. They conclude that “international law provides little 
protection for civilian populations in times of war. Whatever pressures toward restraint 
these treaties may exert on their signatories appear to be overwhelmed by the strategic 
incentives that combatants face to prevail and limit the costs of war to their own citizens” 
(Valentino et al 2006).  However, much more could be done to understand the indirect 
influence of these treaties on war fighting, including their possible influence on the 
choice of a strategy itself.  If ratifiers are much less willing to lay siege to an enemy 20 
causing the starvation of its population, there is some risk that the effect of the legal norm 
is being masked by the choice of strategy.   
An even more ambitious effort to understand the dynamics of the laws of war is 
James Morrow’s study of eight different sub-issue areas, including aerial bombardment, 
armistice/ceasefire, chemical and biological weapons, treatment of civilians, protection of 
cultural property, conduct on the high seas, treatment of prisoners of war, and treatment 
of the wounded (Morrow 2007).  Using different data and methods, Morrow does to some 
extent corroborate the findings of Valentino et al, in that he finds the treatment of civilian 
populations to be especially problematic in war time.  This is hardly the end of the story 
however.  Morrow draws on signaling theory to argue that “Treaties are a public signal 
that a state accepts a standard by ratifying it, and so will live up to the standard of that 
treaty if it goes to war…Ratification by both sides is necessary for them to understand 
that they intend to honor that standard to the best of their ability” (Morrow 2007).  
Morrow is not explicit about why such a signal would be credible to an adversary, 
although he does suggest that in a democratic setting, audience costs help to hold 
governments to their international commitments.  The model he proposes allows for an 
indirect role for treaty ratification: treaties clarify what is, and what is not acceptable 
behavior, which allows adversaries in war more precisely to respond to violations in kind.  
This reciprocity, in turn, is associated with higher levels of compliance with the laws of 
war.  Morrow’s key finding is that a state is more likely to violate the laws of war 
reciprocally when it is clear the adversary has done so; when both have ratified the 
relevant treaty, and when both of these conditions hold (a triple interaction term).  Merely 
to have ratified does not produce better compliance, but by facilitating reciprocity, he 21 
argues the treaties have made important if indirect contributions to the somewhat more 
humane conduct of war.  
Arguments for treaty compliance based on legal principles are by nature rare in 
the security area.  As we have seen, theories of compliance or violation of international 
agreements in the security area tend to be based on arguments about reciprocity, the 
ability to send credible signals, or the ex post costs associated with reneging.  It is 
therefore quite refreshing to consider the results of a study by Judith Kelley on states’ 
(un)willingness to renege on their formal legal commitments to the International Criminal 
Court (Kelley 2007).  Kelley asks, why do states live up to their legal obligations to 
cooperate with the ICC, especially in the face pressures any realist might assume would 
cause them to violate?  Between 2002 and 2006, the United States applied very tangible 
forms of pressure – from diplomatic up to and including the threat of withdrawing 
military aid – to countries that refused to sign a mutual non-surrender agreement with the 
US.  These agreements created bilateral obligations not to surrender one another’s 
nationals to the ICC.  The problem, however, is that such agreements conflict with the 
legal obligation any ratifier of the ICC statutes would have to cooperate with that 
institution.  It is a difficult dilemma: should a state party live up to its ICC obligations 
and risk US sanctions, or should they stand up to the US, and stand by the ICC? 
Kelley argues that despite the threats of the United States, some states resisted for 
very principled reasons. Some states had a strong affinity for the purposes of the ICC.  
She presents evidence from a cross sectional probit that democracies, the “like-minded 
countries” (the hard-core IC supporters during the negotiations) and states with sterling 
human rights records tended to ratify the ICC statutes.  But even more revealing, states 22 
with a strong commitment to the rule of law refused to go back on their ICC 
commitments.  The interaction of a strong commitment to the rule of law and a previous 
ratification was a strong predictor (again, in a cross-sectional probit model) that a state 
would refuse to ratify a mutual non-surrender agreement with the United States.  Four 
case studies – Botswana, Costa Rica, Estonia and Australia – provide the context for 
these findings.  While Botswana reneged, all of the other three rebuffed the US, stuck 
with the ICC, and cited the importance of consistency with their prior legal obligations as 
the primary reason.  Kelley concludes that “...international agreements can be effective 
across a broad spectrum of issue areas, not just in cases with clearly identified material 
payoffs of iterated cooperation” (Kelley 2007).  She argues that a strong commitment to 
the rule of law highly conditions any general claims about the overall “compliance pull” 
of treaties generally. Consistent with normative theories of behavior, the “tug” is 
strongest for those polities that place the highest value on the rule of law. 
While all of the above studies center on the question of first order compliance – 
or compliance with the substantive provisions of a treaty arrangement – growing attention 
has been given recently to the question of second order compliance – or compliance with 
the authoritative ruling of a third party when the substantive rules are under dispute.  
Why comply with the decisions of international tribunals, especially when a crucial 
national security issue is at stake?  The answer that some scholars have advanced is an 
interesting mix of rational decisionmaking under normative constraints.  Tribunals are 
theorized as an authoritative embodiment of the will of the international community.  To 
comply with their decisions is often a rational strategy because of how it will be 
interpreted by other states.  Drawing on theories of reputation and the interpretation of 23 
signals, and assuming there are important gains to be had from settlement, complying 
with the decisions of international tribunals is a chance for a “losing” disputant to make a 
territorial concession to an adversary that it would be difficult to make politically in the 
absence of the third party authoritative decision .(Allee & Huth 2006; Simmons 2002). 
Sara Mitchell and Paul Hensel use a selection model to demonstrate empirically that 
governments are more likely to comply with the decisions of an authoritative third party 
than they are with an agreement reached on their own (Mitchell & Hensel 2007). These 
findings illuminate how the legal context potentially shapes the meaning of actions: 
deferring to legal authority signals a law abiding character, while deferring to an 
adversary signals nothing but weakness.  This is a powerful demonstration of the need to 
marry rational accounts with subjective understandings of behavior. 
 
Trade Liberalization 
A surprisingly small amount of research has been done on compliance with 
international trade treaties.  Indeed, the literature does not focus so much on compliance 
or violation as on the effectiveness of the international trade regime to stimulate trade 
between nations.  This may speak to the consequences of international law, but not 
specifically to the conditions under which state parties comply with or violate their treaty 
obligations.  It is likely that effectiveness is related to compliance – one reason states 
have been willing to liberalize their trade policies is likely due to the reciprocal 
compliance of other states – but it is not a direct test of the behavioral proposition that 
governments comply with their agreements in this area.  After all, governments could be 24 
in complete compliance with their agreements, but if the agreements require them to do 
very little, the effect on trade volumes and directions could be expected to be modest.   
In contrast to the security area, political and legal analysts have tended to assume 
that there is a very high degree of compliance with most international commercial law.  
In the area of trade, the role of reciprocity is thought to be so strong that there is no 
realistic option to cooperation; no state would want to risk withdrawal from the network 
of liberalizing treaties that (presumably) have done so much to further market integration 
in goods and services over the past several decades.  Some have cited the tremendous 
reductions in tariff rates over the past few decades, and concluded that “in the case of 
tariff cuts, implementation is compliance” (McNamara 2004).  Others have looked to the 
operation of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and are 
satisfied that panel decisions are complied with some 90 per cent of the time (Wilson 
2007). But the truth of the matter is that political scientists have spent much more time 
researching trade bargaining within WTO institutions than compliance per se  (Busch & 
Reinhardt 2003; Guzman & Simmons 2002).  We know surprisingly little about actual 
compliance with international trade law.  
Systematic research on compliance with international trade law is much more 
difficult than one would expect.  A convincing dataset on compliance with treaty law in 
this area would be a mind-boggling endeavor, even if one were to focus only on the WTO 
and set aside the large number of regional agreements governing trade relationships.  
Unlike the study of international humanitarian law, there is no obvious unit of analysis 
such as “warring dyad” on which to focus research. Trade policies are implemented on 
thousands of products, and in the absence of authoritative rulings, it is hard to know 25 
which policies are consistent with treaty obligations and which are not.  It might be 
possible to piece together a picture of allegations of non-compliance from national 
sources, as Christina Davis has done in her forthcoming study of trade between the 
United States, Japan, and Europe, but Davis – appropriately – uses such data as an 
indicator of “potential disputes” and not treaty violations  (Davis forthcoming).  It might 
also be possible to create a “compliance” database based on reports by the secretariat 
pursuant to the periodic Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).  But the WTO is 
pretty clear that these reports are not determinations of legal compliance with treaty 
obligations (see Annex III of the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994). 
The easiest way to think about compliance with international trade law is to take 
Kathleen McNamara’s suggestion and accept the assertion that effectiveness is a good 
approximation of compliance.  If states are complying with their obligations under the 
GATT/WTO, we might expect the reduction of trade barriers and growth in trade among 
GATT/WTO members. Using a standard gravity model as his baseline, Andrew Rose 
found however that countries that had joined the GATT or WTO had trade patterns that 
were largely indistinguishable from those that had not (Rose 2004).  This finding was 
immediately criticized by researchers using more fine-grained data and who used a less 
formalistic definition of “membership.”  Judith Goldstein and her co-authors argued that 
it was important to look at effective participation in the regime in order to determine its 
effects  (Goldstein et al 2007).  When territories, dependencies, and newly independent 
countries are included, they argue, there is in fact a significant and positive effect of 
“joining”, especially among the advanced industrialized economies, but also between 
these and the developing countries.  They argue that the rules of the regime have served 26 
to support clear expectations of reciprocity, limit tit-for-tat protectionist behaviors, and to 
lock-in liberal policies on future governments of participating states. The implication of 
this research is that there was “enough” compliance with the various treaty obligations to 
make a marked positive impact on bilateral trade. Despite the sophistication of the data 
and the quantitative model, neither Rose nor Goldstein et al account for the endogeneity 
of joining these trade agreements in the first place.  There is a significant literature which 
discusses the impact of alliances and security arrangements on trade  (Gowa 1994).  If 
these non-economic factors explain both the likelihood of a trade agreement and also has 
an independent effect on trade itself, any relationship between participation in trade 
agreements and trade outcomes could be spurious. 
A second stream of research attempts to leverage information on the different 
ways in which states implement their “protectionist” trade policies. Chad Bown 
distinguishes instances in which countries have implemented “legal” protection under the 
safeguards provisions (found in their notifications under the GATT’s Articles XIX and 
XXVIII) from instances in which they went ahead with illegal measures that in fact 
eventually were referred to the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process (Bown 2004).  
Bown finds that the ability to retaliate and especially the ability to alter the terms of trade 
in one’s own favor has a significant impact on the willingness simply to violate the 
agreement – and let the trade partners complain.  Governments are much more likely to 
appeal to “legal” protection under the safeguards clause if they are unable to influence the 
terms of trade in their favor through protection.  Thus the “bilateral imbalance of power” 
is one of the main factors behind bald violations. These results coincide with Keisuke’s 
description of trade disputes between the United States in Japan. He argues Japan has 27 
been quite reluctant to retaliate – even legally – when the United States institutes trade 
policies that violate GATT/WTO rules  (Iida 2006). 
Despite the fact that trade agreements are generally highly likely to be “self-
enforcing” as discussed above, a good deal of research has focused on the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the GATT/WTO.  The odd fact on which there seems to be a 
good deal of consensus is that 90 of all adopted decisions of WTO involve a finding of a 
violation, and in practically every case the violator complies with the decision of the 
panel (Wilson 2007).  Why such a high compliance rate, especially given that many of 
these cases that escalate to a formal panel decision are politically “hard” cases to solve 
(Davis forthcoming; Guzman & Simmons 2002)?   
Two answers can be found in the literature.  One emphasizes that defiance of 
authoritative decisions of third parties have an even stronger negative impact on a 
country’s reputation than non-compliance with the original agreement.  As discussed 
above in the context of territorial concessions, third party decisions represent in some 
sense the will of the international community; they clarify the nature of the violation and 
what steps are necessary to correct it.  In a world of constructed reputations, continuing to 
violate a rule in the face of an authoritative decision sends a strong signal that that 
particular state (or perhaps government) is not a trustworthy trade partner.  Daniel Kono’s 
study of  how trade dispute settlement mechanisms facilitate reciprocity provides a good 
empirical example of this claim  (Kono 2007). He argues that defiance of WTO decisions 
inflicts too heavy a reputational toll.  Christina Davis’s model further suggests that 
governments may be willing to comply with the WTO panel decisions because with an 
unfavorable decision in hand, they can tell their domestic producers they did their best to 28 
defend their interests (Davis forthcoming). Once again, researchers are finding that it is 
much more palatable and strategically sensible to concede to legal authority than to the 
demands of a trade partner.  
Finally, there is a lively debate in the trade compliance literature about the role 
that institutional design plays in eliciting deeper levels of cooperation.  On the one hand, 
some scholars appeal to the logic of hands tying and argue that tight rules that credibly 
impose costs elicit better compliance  Jide Nzelibe argues in the context of WTO 
enforcement that the credible threat of inflicting serious political costs on a violating state 
through retaliation is a way to mobilize “powerful export groups in the scofflaw state 
against protectionist policies” (Nzelibe 2005).  By contrast, some scholars argue that 
flexibility is the key to deeper cooperation (Rosendorff 2005).  The idea here is that states 
will agree to deeper commitments in the first place if they know there are some 
conditions under which these commitments can be relaxed.  Jeffrey Kucik and Eric 
Reinhardt produce some evidence for the flexibility proposition by looking at the 
prevalence of domestic anti-dumping mechanisms (which provide the “flexibility”) and 
the likelihood that a country will join the WTO and lower its tariff rates once it does 
(Kucik & Reinhardt 2008).  Kucik and Reinhardt have a clever way to control for the 
endogeneity of domestic anti-dumping mechanisms: by looking at whether a country has 
been a target of others’ anti-dumping rules, and by looking at the regional density of anti-
dumping rules, which, they argue, is likely to elicit the use of such rules by other 
countries in the region.  They find that flexibility defined this way does indeed improve 
trade cooperation: states with domestic anti-dumping mechanisms were more likely to 
join and more likely to make deeper concessions on tariffs.  In this case anyway, it 29 
appears that safeguards encourage deeper cooperation.  It may be that flexible treaties 
elicit better compliance, precisely because they encourage states to make deeper 
commitments in the first place.  
 
International Environmental Regulation 
The study of compliance with international environmental treaties got its start in 
the 1990s with a rich case study literature.  Ronald Mitchell was one of the first political 
scientists to explore the impact of the design of international environmental institutions 
on the incentives actors have to pollute the natural environment, with his often cited 
study of intentional oil pollution at sea  (Mitchell 1994).  His research – which showed 
that transparency played a crucial role in compliance with anti-pollution rules – sparked 
interest among international relations scholars in the possibility that and institutions could 
indeed provide the tools to encourage states to comply with their international obligations 
and private actors to refrain from environmental degradation.  A series of very important 
case study collections appeared within years.  Some of the most influential were focused 
on the question of treaty effectiveness and only incidentally on the issue of compliance 
and violation (Victor et al 1998).  Others were focused quite squarely on the compliance 
issue, including a collection by Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K Jacobson.  Their 
volume put a number of issues on the table – including the crucial role of state capacity to 
implement often complex regulatory agreements; the difficulties of constraining private 
actors; the state of knowledge and science; and the use of positive and negative 
inducements to encourage compliance (Weiss & Jacobson 1998).  The theoretical 30 
orientation of the literature has not changed much in the long decade since these books 
were published.  
In contrast to the other issues areas discussed in this review, compliance with 
international environmental law involves regulations that attempt to chance the behaviors 
of private actors, in particular commercial entities.  More than the other issue areas, 
competitive factors can push toward treaty violation, as firms want to reduce costs and 
the states in which they are domiciled often are prevailed on to aid and abet competitive 
strategies. Compliance with certain international environmental agreements can be 
expensive for industry, at least initially.  Where violators can be excluded from certain 
international “club goods”, however, compliance rates can be improved.  Elizabeth 
Desombre’s study of compliance in the international shipping industry provides a good 
example (DeSombre 2006).  She notes that despite the economic pressure to cut corners 
and violate agreements, the ability of port states, international labor unions, 
intergovernmental fishery organizations, and high-standard industry actors to exclude 
violators associated with particular flags of convenience has helped to nudge some of the 
worst polluters toward at least partial compliance.  
Since environmental protection is a regulatory policy that involves a broad array 
of non-governmental actors, it is not surprising that models stressing the civil society and 
interest aggregation abound.  Patrick Bernhagen proposes a model in which business 
organization, structural strength and information asymmetries predict low compliance 
with multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in general, and the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in particular (Bernhagen 2008).  Bernhagen 
measures compliance in two ways: first, by a scale of elite perceptions of regime 31 
compliance are taken from the World Economic Forum’s 2000 Global Competitiveness 
Report; and second by actual reductions in greenhouse gasses.  With only 35 advanced 
industrialized countries in the sample and a cross-sectional design (for the year 2000), it 
is not surprising that the actual results of these tests are quite thin, especially since the 
measures on the explanatory variables are very poor proxies.  But Bernhagen does find 
that greater participation by NGOs and corporatist forms of interest mediation contribute 
to higher compliance, suggesting that participation by non-business civil society groups 
can have a strong positive influence on compliance with MEAs (Bernhagen 2008; see 
also Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004). 
Xinuan Dai’s work, discussed in the theoretical section above, is a sophisticated 
example of the role that information provision plays in a domestic political context (Dai 
2007).  She has shown – logically and with empirical case study evidence – that when 
international regimes generate new information about government compliance efforts, 
groups with an interest in compliance stand a much better chance of holding their 
government accountable.  The key in Dai’s work is that new information allows for the 
triggering of domestic accountability mechanisms, in contrast to the centralized 
enforcement mechanisms discussed elsewhere. Empirically, Dai demonstrates that 
compliance is greatest in countries that have very active domestic groups in the area 
covered by the treaty. Specifically, Dai shows there is a clear correlation in the rankings 
of the countries that are party to the 1985 Sulphur Protocol according to Eurobarometer 
data on the level of domestic environmental activism mobilized around the acid rain issue 
and subsequent compliance behavior.   Information generated by the international 32 
institution provides the possibility for enhanced domestic accountability in her account 
(Dai 2007). 
As in other areas of compliance research, there has been a recent trend toward 
quantitative work on compliance with environmental accords.  One of the most notable 
efforts to build a database containing a broad range of environmental “regimes” (clusters 
of treaties in a specific issue area) is the recently available International Regimes 
Database project directed by Oran Young and Michael Zürn (Young & Zürn 2006).  This 
was an ambitious project, some 15 years in the making, to get a thorough understanding 
of how legal regimes are created, managed, change, and are complied with in the 
environmental area.  The investigators asked experts to answer specific (but highly 
subjective) questions about particular regimes, or regime components, including 
compliance  The unit of analysis in this database is the regime or regime component 
itself, rather than countries or country-years common in much of the quantitative 
compliance literature.  Some thirty environmental regimes – from the Antarctic Treaty to 
the Tropical Timber Trade regime – were coded on a 5-point scale from “behavior 
exceeds requirements” to “behavior does not confirm at all” (Breitmeier et al 2006).  This 
format facilitates comparison across a number of treaty obligations for the international 
community as a whole.  The disadvantage is that the data cannot be used to analyze the 
compliance patterns of particular countries – with the exception of a few of the “most 
important” (which are selected on an ad hoc basis by the expert doing the coding).  
Moreover, the data are not arranged as a time series, making it challenging to explore 
change over time.  While “watershed” years are used to mark important changes within 
regimes, the database is not designed for serious dynamic analyses. Finally, there is the 33 
problem of knowing what the experts are coding.  They were given very clear 
instructions on the criteria for making their judgments, but it is not clear what data the 
expert coders based their judgments on. While the IRD is a good effort to collect 
theoretical relevant information – of the kind for example that would address the claims 
of constructivists as well as liberal institutionalists – it is difficult for outsiders to evaluate 
what behaviors constitute compliance in this database. 
Two books have come out of the IRD, written by the project directors (Breitmeier 
2008; Breitmeier et al 2006).  One of the main findings is that compliance with these 
regimes is quite high generally, and especially among the “most important” states.  
Furthermore, compliance has tended to increase after major watersheds, despite the fact 
that the obligations in many of these regimes have deepened – evidence considered to run 
contra to the ideas of George Downs and co-authors.  Some effort is made to correlate 
compliance with certain regime provisions, such as differentiable obligations, which the 
researchers claim lowers rather than improves compliance, contra the expectations of 
those who stress capacity limitations as a major cause of non-compliance with 
environmental agreements.  The problem, however, is that unless there is some way to 
control for why these regime provisions were chosen in the first place, it is hard to 
attribute a causal story to them. 
 
Human Rights 
The literature on violation of and compliance with international human rights 
treaties has burgeoned and changed considerably over the past decade.  Qualitative work 
dominated the scene until relatively recently.  Quantitative work now rivals traditional 34 
qualitative approaches in terms of sheer numbers of studies.  In this respect, the human 
rights research has now – for better or worse – joined the mainstream of quantitative 
social science, especially in the major political science journals.  There is still room to 
deploy mixed methods in book length studies, monographs and law reviews, but the 
constraints on page numbers and the development of widely used datasets relating to 
human rights practices has served to boost significantly the number of quantitative 
studies in political science research.  
Human rights as an issue area is quite different from all the areas reviewed above 
in several critical respects.  It is perhaps the least likely area to engage the interests or 
attention of other states, who typically see the treatment of foreign citizens as peripheral 
to their interests.  It does not engage reciprocity in any significant way, weakening the 
possibilities for mutually beneficial self-enforcing agreements. A number of scholars 
have noted that functionalist theories based on joint gains and reciprocity are a very poor 
fit for understanding compliance and violation in the human rights area (Simmons 2009). 
It is certainly an area in which non-material issues, including human respect and dignity, 
are at the forefront.  Lacking the theoretical tools for understanding nuanced patterns of 
violation and compliance in this area, traditional realists simply assert that “Most human 
rights practices are explained by coercion or coincidence of interest” (Goldsmith & 
Posner 2005).  
More than any other issue area, human rights practices are difficult to understand 
without a theory of normative acceptance.  A large literature has developed that eschews 
a strictly rational approach in favor of more normative drivers and subjectivist influences 
on human rights behaviors. The foundational work related to norm adoption and 35 
compliance was that of Thomas Risse, Steven Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, who advanced 
a “spiral model” for the adoption of international human rights norms.  Their theory 
posited repression, followed by the activation of domestic and transnational groups, 
“tactical concessions” by governments to assuage complaints about repressive practices, 
and eventually rule-compliant behavior. While they were not theorizing compliance with 
international treaties specifically, this research had alerted political scientists to the 
possibility that in some cases treaty ratification may be a tactical concession governments 
make to assuage critics that a government is “committed” to decent human rights 
practices (Risse-Kappen et al 1999). But once such tactical concessions have been made, 
actors begin regularly to refer to human rights norms (e.g., treaties) to refer to or 
comment on their own behavior. These theorists draw on theories of discourse, that 
emphasize the power of persuasion, discussion and language to change ideas of what 
constitutes appropriate behavior (Hawkins 2004).  Having gained salience as a rule, 
human rights norms may eventually come to be internalized, resulting ultimately in “rule-
consistent behavior.”  In this view, treaty ratification may ultimately (though obviously 
not necessarily) contribute to the internalization of higher human rights standards, as 
governments begin to defend and define their actions – with ongoing persuasive efforts 
by international, transnational, and domestic actors -  on the basis of their provisions.   
One of the earliest efforts to test for the effects of human rights treaties on state 
behavior was Linda Camp-Keith’s study of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Extending a model initially developed by  Poe and Tate to 
explain civil and political rights (Freedom House measures) and Gibney and Stohl’s 
“personal integrity index,” Keith added ratification to the right hand side of the pooled 36 
time series to see if ratification had any independent effects on these outcomes.  She 
found none that withstood her multivariate analysis. Some states, evidently, were 
continuing to violate norms such that it was not possible to detect an influence to the 
ICCPR ratification on average.  She speculated that her results were due to weak external 
enforcement as well as “a serious domestic situation, such as civil war or domestic unrest, 
that interferes with [governments’] ability to keep their commitment or that lessens their 
willingness to keep their commitment" (Keith 1999).   
More quantitative tests followed, covering a larger number of treaties, and 
sparking debates not only among political scientists but among legal scholars as well.  
One puzzle was why obviously repressive governments ratified human rights treaties at 
all.  James Vreeland argues that in the case of torture, governments are sometimes 
making a tactical concession to their domestic political opponents, which explains why 
ratification of the CAT is more common in repressive regimes that allow some degree of 
political competition than in those that do not (Vreeland 2008). The fact that external 
enforcement has been quite weak some scholars to view ratification as an expressive act 
that does not signal any intent to comply with the contents of the treaty.  Early work by 
Oona Hathaway broke ranks with the assumptions of many legal scholars when she 
found, using quantitative evidence, that countries that ratified the Convention Against 
Torture, for example, were just as (perhaps more) likely to torture they citizens as 
countries that had not ratified (Hathaway 2002).  
Hathaway’s work was path-breaking for a number of reasons.  It was one of the 
first studies to do a careful job to research the exact nature of the behavior the treaty 
addressed, and developed careful indicators for these behaviors based on the actual 37 
provisions in the treaties.   She devised a “torture scale” and a “fair trials scale” both of 
which are more appropriate for testing treaty compliance with the ICCPR and the CAT 
than broad indicators such as Freedom House’s “Civil and Political Rights” that were 
devised for completely different purposes.   In a few cases, however, she confuses the 
concepts of treaty compliance and violation with the concept of treaty effectiveness; for 
example, the use of the number of women in parliament is more a measure of 
effectiveness of rather than compliance with the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women.  In one case there is a serious treaty obligation-data mismatch: the use of 
politicide data to test for the impact of the Genocide Convention.  But overall all, no 
empirical paper has done more to begin a conversation about the empirical consequences 
of ratification of human rights treaties than did Hathaway’s 2002 study. 
Scholars inspired by theories originating in institutional sociology come to similar 
conclusions as Hathaway’s through different mechanisms.  Institutional sociology touts 
the power of “world society” to generate and diffuse norms of behavior that mimic 
accepted scripts of modernity – encouraging countries on the periphery to display 
outward forms in conformity with the institutions and forms of leading states of the 
western world – without internalizing the values behind these forms.  The theory predicts 
a “radical decoupling” of treaty commitments, which are said to be “expected” of all 
modern states, from actual rights behaviors (Cole 2005; Wotipka & Ramirez 2008). 
Emily Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui consequently argue that ratification of human 
rights treaties is not associated with better rights performance.  The key explanatory 
variable in their study is the number of human rights treaties a country has ratified among 
the “core six” they select.  There is little evidence that ratification of more treaties 38 
reduces political repression when modeled in this fashion, causing these authors to 
conclude that ratification is little more than a “paradox of empty promises” (Hafner-
Burton & Tsutsui 2005).  
This early quantitative work – which has been cited frequently in the political 
science literature – suffers from a few weaknesses.  First, there is the problem of 
matching treaty obligations with indicators of compliance outcomes. Hathaway’s work in 
this respect, as discussed above, was both pathbreaking and problematic. Certainly, 
lumping the number of treaty ratifications together and expecting the more the merrier is 
highly suspect.  Studies that look at the number of treaties ratified as the key dependent 
variable are likely to be picking up the ease of ratification in particular institutional 
contexts, rather than a specific international legal commitment.  Second, in common with 
several studies in other issue areas, all of the early quantitative studies discussed above 
treated treaty ratification as exogenous.  But it can hardly be the case that states randomly 
sort into ratifiers and non-ratifiers.  Third, the early studies were designed only to detect 
homogenous effects across all states alike.  Despite acknowledging a complex social and 
political world, the treaties are modeled as unmediated and their effects unconditional.  
Practically no one who has done qualitative work in this area imagines such a 
determinative or direct mechanism. Rather, they see treaties as tools for strategic or 
normatively driven actors to change the politics of human rights compliance in specific 
institutional contexts. 
These issues became central to the next generation of quantitative human rights 
research, which took off right around 2005.  Todd Landman was one of the first 
researchers to hypothesize that we could expect very different levels of compliance with 39 
human rights treaties based on the nature of the governing regime. He noticed that 
democracies ratify these agreements more readily than do autocracies, and third- and 
fourth-wave democracies ratify more readily with fewer reservations than do the 
established democracies.  The third and fourth waves’ actual rights practices tend to be 
far worse. Like all the quantitative human rights studies discussed above, Landman’s 
general strategy is to use time-series cross-sectional analyses, but he endogenizes the 
treaty commitment itself. He examines first the ratification decision and then the rights 
indicators as dependent variables, followed by a two-stage estimation that endogenizes 
treaty ratification with “instrumental” variables to explain rights practices. His key result: 
the more committed a country is to a key rights treaty (taking reservations and optional 
protocols into account), the stronger the improvement in rights practices.  Unfortunately, 
the key instruments in this study are not likely to be very valid.  Ratification is modeled 
as a function of democracy, wealth, and membership in IGOs and the presence (not well-
defined) of NGOs, none of these can remotely be thought of as affecting human rights 
practices only through their relationship with ratification.  Even so, Landman did move 
research forward by attempting to explain commitment and compliance simultaneously, 
and by attempting to sort out the consequences of ratification in different political 
contexts.  He was also one of the first to demonstrate quantitatively any positive 
consequences to the ratification of human rights treaties.  
Nearly contemporaneously, similar studies were published of a very similar 
nature.  Taking an agnostic position toward theory, Erik Neumayer ran a similar 
regression, this time interacting ratification with the continuous polity scale and with the 
number of international non-governmental organizations per capita (Neumayer 2005). 40 
Like the studies above, Neumayer focused on two dependent variables: the Political 
Terror Scale and the Freedom House measure of civil rights, and looked for effects of a 
battery of treaties, including the ICCPR, the torture convention, these agreements’ 
optional protocols, and various regional agreements of a comparable nature.  He found no 
improvement or even worsening personal integrity rights among ratifiers who scored zero 
on the polity scale, as well as among states with zero INGOs per capita (although one 
should wonder whether the latter category is meaningful) Neumayer checks for the 
robustness of these results with a Heckman selection model, with a curious justification 
for instruments: he holds that ‘newly independent countries receive greater attention with 
respect to their human rights record as do former colonies” (Neumayer 2005) but the 
likelihood of scrutiny seems to be precisely the mechanism that drives his results for the 
importance of INGOs and democracies.  
More research effort has gone recently into the mechanisms through which human 
rights treaties might be enforced.  Emilie Hafner-Burton argues that human rights don’t 
just improve on their own accord; improvements are instead associated with hard-nosed 
efforts by the international community to link preferential trade agreements to 
improvements (Hafner-Burton 2005). More recently, James Lebovic and Erik Voeten  
have shown that the World Bank tends to reduce its aid to countries that have been named 
as severe rights abusers by resolutions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
(now Council) (Lebovic & Voeten 2009).  But what no one has shown is that there is any 
significant external enforcement behind the provisions of international human rights 
treaties, of a kind that might plausibly account for the patterns of compliance observed 
across a number of rights areas.  41 
 
Human rights treaties seem to elicit extraordinarily weak external enforcement 
(the realists have a point here), appealing norms (highlighted by constructivists) and yet 
the real stakeholders – almost unique among areas regulated by international treaties – 
are overwhelmingly domestic groups and individuals.  This has led to a new focus on 
ways in which international treaties influence domestic politics.  Beth Simmons argues 
that international treaties can influence domestic politics in (at least) three ways.  First, 
they change national agendas; that is they put new issues on the legislative table that may 
not be that controversial, but were most definitely exogenous to the national processes 
that generate legislation.  Dealing with what comes from the international community can 
alter practices – as long as they are not too controversial.  Second, Simmons argues that 
treaties are important resources in many legal systems around the world.  They can be 
used in litigation directly (cited as an authoritative legal source) or they can give rise to 
domestic implementing legislation which itself becomes a tool in local court cases.  This 
can only influence compliance of course when national courts are competent and 
independent from national governments (Powell & Staton 2009).  Third, treaties can be 
useful to encourage local groups to mobilize to demand attention to rights compliance. 
Ratified treaties encourage domestic stakeholders to begin to see themselves as such (an 
“identity” mechanism, in constructivist terms).  They are also a tool that can be used to 
gain legitimacy, allies, and media attention.  In effect, the ratification of international 
human rights treaties change the political opportunity structure in ways that increase the 
likelihood that governments will edge toward compliance with their obligations.   42 
This book-length study has the luxury of scale to explore these ideas in detail, 
including quantitative and qualitative analyses of four different human rights treaty 
regimes: civil and political rights, women rights, the torture convention, and children’s 
rights. The primary finding is that treaties have their most consistent impacts where a 
theory based on domestic politics would indeed expect them: in polities in which 
domestic stakeholders have both the motive and the means to organize to demand 
compliance.  Simmons argues that in stable autocracies, citizens do not have a way to 
mobilize without being crushed.  In stable democracies, where rights are well-protected, 
they have no real motive to mobilize.  But treaties become useful tools precisely in those 
cases in which locals have a reason to use them strategically to press their claims: in 
partial and transitioning democracies. The results show that certain rights, such as 
practices that reduce torture, are correlated with treaty ratification in this middle category 
of countries, but not in stable democracies or autocracies. The women’s treaty has 
improved girls’ and women’s access to jobs and education in secular countries and where 
courts are independent enough to enforce the treaties’ implementing legislation.  Overall, 
there is a reasonable fit between Simmons’ theory of domestic mobilization and patterns 
of treaty compliance across time and space.  
If it were ever the case that findings about compliance with human rights treaties 
are dependent on the use of qualitative versus quantitative methods (Hafner-Burton & 
Ron 2009), the new research shows that such a claim in no longer tenable.  Simmons’ 
largely quantitative study is generally positive about the possibilities for compliance with 
international human rights treaties.  On the other hand, another excellent study that is 
largely qualitative is more skeptical.  Sonia Cardenas’s study of compliance with human 43 
rights treaties utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods, and finds that the more 
national security seems to be at stake, and the stronger “pro-violation constituencies” 
within a country, the more states are likely to violate human rights treaties and try 
disingenuously to appear to comply with their obligations (Cardenas 2007). These claims 
are not incompatible, neither do they rest on the peculiarities of quantitative versus 
qualitative methods. The best research moves away from unqualified claims, and 
develops a nuanced picture of how strategic as well as principled agents use treaties as 
tools – sometimes successfully, sometime not – to achieve their rights objectives.  
 
III.  Conclusions 
Research on compliance with and violation of international treaties has been a 
growth industry within international relations subfield within the past decade.  Space for 
considering the relationship between rules and behavior opened up as structural realism 
receded and a more strategic realism that could accommodate theories of self-enforcing 
agreements, signaling, and hands-tying came to take its place.  Far from idealist, this 
literature developed under the assumption that much if not most treaty compliance could 
be understood in terms of self-interested behavior, properly understood.  In the absence 
of third party enforcement, reciprocity was often the only hope for sustained cooperation 
in some issue areas, such as the laws of war.  But what is become clearer is that treaties 
have made an important contribution to the ability of states to contract with one another: 
to make deals that are credible and follow rules that are relatively clear. 
Perhaps the best way to characterize the contribution of treaties to the broader 
problem of cooperation is to emphasize their deeper social meaning.  They heighten 44 
reputational costs precisely because the international community and domestic audiences 
understand them as serious obligations that signal a commitment to behave according to a 
specified set of rules.  They legitimate certain claims and de-legitimate others.  The great 
intellectual leap forward has been to develop a wider peripheral vision about what 
constitutes a fully specified rational model of treaty compliance.  Without a theory of 
social constructed norms to gird a claim about the reputation consequences of non-
compliance, we have understood only half of the problem and still cannot grasp what it it 
about treaties that seems to “put it all on the line” for states reputationally. Without a 
theory of socially constructed norms, we can do little better than to gesture towards 
crucial yet hollow constructs such as “common knowledge” essential to the establishment 
of focal points and stable expectations about behavior.  The partial collapse of distinct 
and mutually exclusive schools of thought has hastened a clearer understanding of 
compliance with what on the surface appear to be no more than scraps of paper. 
That is all to the good, but hurdles in this research program remain.  I have 
mentioned at various points in this review the problem of endogeneity and selection 
effects; these are rampant and mar to some extent many if not most of the studies in this 
review.  A few of these studies are fortunate that a fairly exogenous process has 
stimulated the compliance problem – such as the United States effort to get states not to 
cooperate with the ICC in Judith Kelley’s study.  Other studies such those of Sarah 
Mitchell and Paul Hensel, Beth Simmons, and Todd Landman, evince an awareness of 
the problem and try to employ statistical methods to address it, with varying degrees of 
success.   At this point, there are no perfect solutions or easy fixes.  But it is important to 45 
think about the prelude to the compliance question: why a particular agreement was 
designed as it was, and what may have motivated states to ratify in the first place. 
Several new directions might prove useful and necessary in the study of treaty 
behavior.  One would be to move away from a state centric model of compliance and take 
more seriously the role of non-state actors as either facilitating or hindering treaty 
compliance or effectiveness.  James Morrow’s consideration of the complications that 
individuals often commit war crimes – counter to the policies or desires of their state is a 
welcome wrinkle to an account of compliance with the laws of war.  Elizabeth 
DeSombre’s discussion of the agency problems involving states and shipping interests 
reminds us that compliance cannot always be commanded from the top down.  John 
Ruggie’s recent writing (Ruggie 2007) on the problem of corporate responsibility and 
compliance with respect to international human rights standards should inspire us to 
supplement our focus on country-years with data on the policies and actions of firms 
themselves.  It would also be interesting to do more research across levels of analysis to 
compare treaty compliance with the response to similar regulations on the national or 
regional level.  When Michael Zürn and colleagues compared compliance national 
compliance with compliance patterns at the regional and international level, they were 
surprised to find that “In none of our sets of comparisons is compliance systematically 
better in the national context than in settings beyond the nation-state” (Zürn & Joerges 
2005).  Innovative research designs of a comparative nature will help to deepen our 
knowledge about what makes international law compliance especially problematic (or 
not). 46 
Most of the political science literature on treaties is focused, appropriately, on a 
behavioral definition of compliance as policies that converge toward those required by 
the legal obligation in question.  As the field begins to mature, we would do well to think 
about the policy implications of the behaviors we are documenting and modeling.  Is 
treaty compliance always good, and violation always bad? Certainly avoiding the 
intentional killing of civilians as a matter of strategy is by almost any standard a good 
outcome, but legal rules can also be used to justify certain war-fighting techniques that 
continue to devastate human settlements  (Smith 2002).  Critical legal theorists – whose 
lack of a forward looking research agenda has contributed to their waning influence – do 
(repeatedly) make at least one good point: law is not an end in itself.  For now the 
challenge has been to demonstrate international law’s effects on state behavior.  Once our 
research matures, we would do well to reflect more broadly on the normative 
consequences that violation and compliance entail.  47 
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